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One powerful and common strategy in defense of global egalitarianism is to show
how and why the accepted arguments for distributive equality within a single state
apply globally as well, that is, why the reasons for caring about inequalities between
fellow citizens are reasons also for caring about inequality between persons in the
world as a whole. For instance, taking (what they take to be) Rawls's central argu-
ment for domestic distributive justice, namely, that individuals should not be dis-
advantaged on account of arbitrary factors such as their social class, natural
endowment, and misfortune, global egalitarians such as Charles Beitz and Thomas
Pogge have argued that neither should individuals be at a disadvantage due to an
accidental fact like their country of birth. So if distributive justice is motivated
by the need to mitigate the effects of contingencies that are "arbitrary from a moral
point of view"2 on people's life chances, this presents a consideration also for global
distributive equality.
The case for global egalitarianism, however, has been challenged by those
whom we may call anti-global egalitarians. These critics (at least those I will be
focusing on) are not anti-egalitarians through and through. They are egalitarians
in that they accept that distributive equality matters domestically. What they reject
is the claim that distributive equality has a global scope or universal applicability.
Such critics include Walzer, D. Miller, R. Miller, Nagel, Freeman, and Rawls.3 And
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3. Richard W. Miller, "Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern," (1998) 27/3 Phil. & Pub.
Affairs 202; David Miller, "Against Global Egalitarianism" (2005) 9/1-2 J. Ethics 55; Michael
Walzer, "Response" in David Miller & Michael Walzer, eds., Pluralism, Justice, and Equality
(Oxford University Press, 1995); Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice" (2005) 33/2
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. XIX, No.2 (July 2006)
it is important to note that anti-global egalitarians need not reject the duty of human-
itarian assistance or the duty of rescue. In fact the anti-global egalitarians that I
will refer to accept that there are duties of assistance towards persons who are unable
to meet basic needs. They will denounce the current global economic arrangement
as unacceptable because many people continue to be deprived of basic and urgent
needs under this arrangement. Their position, however, is non-egalitarian in that
while it holds that there is a moral duty to assist individuals or peoples to help them
achieve minimally decent standards of living, economic inequalities between coun-
tries as such are not matters of justice. To be sure, one could plausibly make the
case that if inequalities between countries become excessive, those at the bottom
end will be in effect deprived of basic needs given the operations of the marketplace.
In this case, anti-global egalitarians will be concerned about the gross inequalities,
not because these inequalities themselves are objectionable from the point of view
ofjustice, but rather because they have the effect of impoverishing persons, abso-
lutely as opposed to just making them relatively worse-off. So anti-global egali-
tarians can in principle be concerned about global inequality, but this concern is
derivative of the deeper commitment to protecting persons' access to basic needs
rather than as a direct concern.4 Thus, it is still open to this position that substantial
inequalities between countries be condoned when these inequalities do not in fact
force anyone below some defined subsistence threshold. For example, we can imag-
ine, say, a global arrangement in which the economic inequalities between countries
exceed the limit permitted by (a globalized) Rawls's difference principle (and so
would exercise Rawlsian global egalitarians like Beitz and Pogge) that is nonetheless
unproblematic for the anti-global egalitarians because no one is forced below the
basic minimum in spite of the inequality. In short, the difference between global
egalitarians and anti-global egalitarians (who however remain committed to human-
itarian assistance) is that the former supports a distributive principle for the purpose
of regulating and limiting economic inequalities globally, whereas the latter is con-
cerned only with ensuring that basic humanitarian needs of all persons are met.
So a significant practical and philosophical difference remains to be addressed:
must global justice include an egalitarian distributive commitment?
I will consider two classes of arguments often deployed by the anti-global egal-
itarians against attempts to universalize the demands of distributive equality. The
first class of arguments tries to show that global egalitarians have misconstrued
the reasons why equality matters domestically, and hence have illegitimately
extended these reasons to the global arena. That is, the reasons why inequality mat-
ters domestically, some anti-global egalitarians say, are reasons that gain traction
Phil. & Pub. Affairs 113; John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1999), esp. Part III; and Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawls
(New York: Oxford University Press) [forthcoming] at chs. 8 and 9, and "The Law of Peoples,
Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive Justice" (2006) 23/1 Soc. Phil. & Policy
29. See also Michael Blake, "Distributive Justice, State Coercion and Autonomy" (2001) 30/3
Phil. & Pub. Affairs 257; David Reidy, "A Just Global Economy: In Defense of Rawls" J. Ethics
[forthcoming], and Joseph Heath, "Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defense" Can. J.
Phil. [forthcoming].
4. See, e.g., David Miller, "Against Global Egalitarianism", supra note 3.
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only in the context of the political society. This class of arguments thus makes a
conceptual point about the scope or boundary of egalitarian distributive justice,
namely, that the boundary of distributive equality is inherently limited by the bound-
aries of states. Call this the thesis of the limited boundary of distributive justice
or the "limited thesis" for short.
The second class of arguments does not directly question the conceptual bound-
ary of egalitarian distributive justice. Rather it provides a limiting argument of a
different kind. Instead of directly rejecting egalitarianism as principle with a global
scope, it proposes that there are competing principles that in effect outweigh the
demands of global equality.' In particular, this class of arguments tries to show that
the claims ofjustice that citizens have against each other do and should limit the
application of any global egalitarian principle. That is, the principle of special con-
cern imposes demands on persons that limit what global equality can in fact demand
of them. Because this line of argument holds that there is something significant
about membership in a state, let me call this the thesis of the ethical significance
of state boundaries, or the "significance of boundaries" thesis for short.
I will reflect on these two sets of arguments in turn. But these two arguments
are related in an important way. An important implication of this two-stage exam-
ination of the boundary of distributive justice and the justice of political boundaries
is that the boundary of distributive justice cannot be co-extensive with social or
political boundaries (as claimed by the limited thesis) when the justice of boundaries
is in question.
II. The Boundary of Distributive Justice
As mentioned, some anti-global egalitarians deny that the reasons in defense of
distributive equality in the domestic context extend to the global context. Global
egalitarians, they argue, fail to see that these egalitarian considerations gain a
"foothold" only in the domestic context because of some special features of domes-
tic political society that are absent in the global setting.6 These unique features of
the political society are what generate the distributive commitment within the soci-
ety. On this view, distributive egalitarian duties do not have universal scope; rather
they are duties that arise only between members of a political society.
What is distinctive about the political society such that distributive egalitarian
considerations arise within its boundaries but not without? A recent line of argument
in defense of the limited thesis focuses on the lawful coercive authority of the state
(e.g., R. Miller; Blake; Nagel). On this view, it is the presence of lawful state coer-
cion that motivates a distributive egalitarian commitment among citizens of the
5. As Dworkin notes, one need not deny the validity of a principle when one takes it to be out-
weighed by other considerations or principles in particular instances. Taking Rights Seriously
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977) at ch. 2. So an anti-global egalitarian may
oppose the universal application of egalitarian justice without denying the universal scope of
a distributive principle, but (more modestly) by showing how other principled considerations
can outweigh the principle of global equality and hence limit its application.
6. Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," supra note 3 at 128.
state. And because there is no coercive lawful authority in the global arena, there
is no grounding for any global distributive egalitarian commitment.
It is important to clarify the real thrust of the argument so as to not misunderstand
and underestimate its force. The argument is not claiming that there can be no dis-
tributive commitments in the global arena because of the absence of an enforcement
authority. If this were so, two responses would be immediately available to the global
egalitarians. First, the argument so construed is highly controversial as a conceptual
point for it takes the concept ofjustice to inherently include the notion of enforce-
ability, such that a demand ofjustice that is unenforceable is not a demand ofjustice
properly speaking. This understanding of the argument may find some grounding
on Hobbes's remark that "covenants, without the sword, are but words". The
Hobbesian may thus be tempted to think that justice has to be enforceable if it is to
be a meaningful concept; and because there is no global authority or government to
enforce the terms of distributive justice in the global arena, distributive justice or injus-
tice "have there no place" (borrowing Hobbes' phrase). Thus the boundary of dis-
tributive justice is necessarily limited to the boundaries of states for it is only within
the boundaries of states that the demands ofjustice are effectively enforceable. For
a label, we can call this the Hobbesian interpretation of the argument from coercion.7
Yet, as should be obvious, this coupling ofjustice with its enforceability is far
from a widely held view of the concept of justice. After all, we can make sense
of what justice demands even in situations where we know (regrettably) that we
are unable to impose or enforce its demands. We can, for instance, embrace the
United Nation's aspiration that developed countries contribute 0.7% of their GDP
to development assistance (though of course this is not an egalitarian commitment
but a commitment to end absolute deprivations) as a requirement ofjustice, while
recognizing that most countries have failed to meet this requirement and so have
failed in their duty ofjustice.8 The enforceability ofjustice and the demands ofjus-
tice refer to two distinct stages in the fulfillment of justice. The first identifies its
content and demands; the second speaks to its compliance and realization.
To be sure, if global distributive demands cannot in fact be enforced without
a global state, this would not bode well for the global egalitarian aspiration. So,
if this is right, global egalitarians may have to rethink the reality of their goal given
the untenability and undesirability of a world state. But this concern relies on
another Hobbesian premise, an empirical one this time, that is also contestable.
It relies on the Hobbesian view of international relations that there can be no
enforcement of justice globally because of the absence of a global political
sovereign. But, and this is the second response of the global egalitarian against
the Hobbesian interpretation of the coercion argument, the claim that there are
7. Hobbes's own views on international justice are arguably more complex and so I intend this lit-
erally as a Hobbesian view rather than Hobbes's own view on the matter. For one discussion on
Hobbes and international law and justice that runs against the traditional view of Hobbes as an
international amoralist, see Larry May, "Jus Cogens Norms" in his Crimes Against Humanity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
8. Indeed, anti-global egalitarians will lament this actual failing on the part of rich countries, given
that the goal here is that of poverty reduction. But they can do this only if they accept the dis-
tinction between what justice demands and how justice can be affected.
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no effective means of enforcing distributive commitments globally absent a world
state is empirically weak. International law is sometimes derided as toothless
because there is no global sovereign to execute its orders. But this caricature of
international law fails to see how the system of international law, along with a
host of other international institutions (including organs like the World Court, etc.)
can set expectations and motivate conformity with these expectations. To use the
catchphrase, there is global governance even in the absence of global government.
The enforcement of global justice need not be perfect, but to say that there is no
enforcement at all without a world sovereign yielding the sword is an
exaggeration.'
Indeed, and closer to my purpose, none of the anti-global egalitarians I will be
discussing endorse the Hobbesian view of a lawless international order. For instance,
Rawls himself believes that global institutional means of enforcing the principles
of his Law of Peoples are available. He thinks that global institutions "such as the
United Nations ideally conceived"'" can have the authority and capacity to express
and enforce the principles of the Law of Peoples, and to regulate the conduct of
peoples. Thus, the feasibility of establishing new or improving global institutions
for implementing and regulating conduct in accordance with principles of global
justice is not ruled out by Rawls. Rawls's reason for denying a global distributive
principle is not that there are no institutional means of lawful international enforce-
ment, but because of his understanding of the basis and philosophical motivation
of egalitarian justice. The Hobbesian interpretation of the argument from lawful
coercion rests on premises about the concept of justice and basic facts about the
international order that Rawls himself will find unacceptable."
The argument from coercion, more powerfully then, is not to be seen as an argu-
ment about the (lack of) enforceability of distributive justice (in the global context),
but as an argument about the inconceivability of distributive justice (in the global
setting). The idea here is that outside the context of a lawful coercive authority,
considerations of distributive equality do not even arise. The problem is not that
the international domain is one in which distributive commitments cannot be
enforced (and hence inappropriate to talk about distributive justice here); the prob-
lem, rather, is that distributive justice concerns do not even take hold in the inter-
national domain. Considerations of distributive egalitarian justice are relevant only
under conditions in which persons share a coercive legal order. The issue, in short,
is how distributive justice is to be conceived not how it is to be enforced.
What is it about lawful coercion that it is said to present a necessary condition
for generating distributive commitments among agents? One line of argument
invokes the ideal of reciprocity to ground the claim. Thus, to pave the way for the
9. For some discussion on international law as "public", and hence not entirely subject to the political
interests of state agents, see Benedict Kingsbury, "The Problem of the Public in Public
International Law" in NOMOS: XLIX. Moral Universalism and Pluralism (New York: New York
University Press) [forthcoming]; and Anne Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004). For criticism of the Hobbesian world view, see Beitz's classic
treatment in Part I, supra note 1.
10. The Law of People, supra note 3 at 36; also at 70.
11. See Rawls's rejection of political realism in Part I of The Law of Peoples, supra note 3.
coercion argument, let me make some preliminary remarks about reciprocity and
distributive egalitarianism, and its implications for global distributive justice.
It is implicit in the idea of a society understood as a fair system of social coop-
eration, in which citizens are considered as free and equal, that the basic social and
political institutions of society must be those that citizens themselves can reasonably
accept. That is, citizens must be able to justify to one another the social arrangement
that they are helping to impose on each other. This requirement that citizens justify
their common political and social order to each other describes the criterion of
reciprocity. As Rawls puts it, the criterion of reciprocity holds that "when terms
are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them
must think it at least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens,
not as dominated or manipulated or under pressure caused by an inferior political
or social position."'" For many liberal egalitarians, including Rawls, it is this criterion
of reciprocity that ultimately grounds a distributive commitment in a democratic
society. As Rawls writes in Justice as Fairness, "taking equal division as the bench-
mark [as is appropriate if we regard citizens as free and equal persons], those who
gain more are to do so on terms acceptable to those who gain less, and in particular
those who gain the least." 3 The difference principle, Rawls writes, is construed
to meet the "reciprocity condition: those who are better off ... are not better off
to the detriment of those who are worse off," but in fact are better of only when
the least well off also benefits. 4
Accordingly, a society that allows great inequalities to exist between rich and
poor would be one whose social and economic order could be reasonably rejected
by some (for example by the worst-off). Those disadvantaged by the arrangement
can reasonably feel that their interests are not being adequately taken account of
if the institutions of society are structured such that those already more fortunate
(because of, say, their natural endowment or social class) are permitted to benefit
further to the detriment of the unfortunate when there are feasible alternative
arrangements under which the disadvantaged can do better. For this reason Rawls
rejects what he refers to as a capitalist welfare state in which citizens are guaranteed
only a basic minimum but where inequalities between them above the threshold
of basic minimum need not be regulated at all. In such a society, the criterion of
reciprocity is violated because the least well-off class will see the better-off to be
benefiting from an arrangement at their expense.5
Defenders of the limited thesis need not claim that the criterion of reciprocity
is of no relevance in the global domain. It seems natural to think, after all, that we
don't just owe fellow citizens justification for the institutions that we are imposing
on them; we also owe foreigners a justification for any global order that we have
a part in helping to impose on them. The idea of reciprocity seems to be a morally
basic one such that it applies among persons who are regarded as moral equals and
12. Ibid. at 14.
13. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: a Restatement, ed. by Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2001) at 123.
14. Ibid. Also at 49, 76-77.
15. Ibid. at 126-30.
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not just between democratic citizens. 6 It is entirely possible, then, that any global
arrangement that allows for great inequalities between countries is one that the
global worst-off persons could not reasonably accept.
Yet for anti-global egalitarians, the ideal of reciprocity generates different eco-
nomic justice commitments in the domestic and global arenas. Rawls, for instance,
while not denying the criterion of international reciprocity, suggests that that ideal
is met in the international domain "once the duty of assistance [between people]
is satisfied and all peoples have a working liberal or democratic government".
Reciprocity between peoples does not require peoples "to narrow the gap between
the average wealth of different peoples."'7 Rawls does not fully explain in The Law
of Peoples why the reciprocity criterion generates different requirements domes-
tically and globally. He simply stipulates that fair cooperation between peoples does
not require any egalitarian distributive commitment among them. To supplement
Rawls's argument, one might be tempted to say that reciprocity generates a dis-
tributive economic commitment only within a democratic society because of the
type of mutuality felt between democratic citizens, and that there is no similar mutu-
ality between persons as such. But this cannot, of course, be merely a descriptive
claim (to wit, that democratic citizens in fact acknowledge and affirm such a mutual
commitment for compatriots, whereas persons of the world as a whole do not). The
argument has to be that it would be unreasonable to reject such mutual expectations
among democratic citizens (for distributive equality) but that it would not be unrea-
sonable to deny a similar expectation in the global setting. But this seems to beg
the question for we can't determine whether an expectation is reasonable or unrea-
sonable until we have a sense of what it is that persons are entitled to as a matter
ofjustice. Thus, the anti-global egalitarian cannot simply dismiss any expectation
for distributive equality on the part of the less advantaged of the world as unrea-
sonable and use that as a basis for determining what global justice can require. So,
it appears that an explanation is still owed by the anti-global egalitarians to show
why the ideal of reciprocity generates distributive egalitarian commitments domes-
tically but not globally.
Some anti-global egalitarians thus emphasize a unique feature of the democratic
political society, such that the expression of reciprocity in the domestic arena entails
a distributive commitment, namely that citizenship in a political society is mem-
bership in a non-voluntary and coercive legal association (e.g., R. Miller; Blake;
Nagel). 8 On this argument, it is the expectation that democratic citizens justify to
each other the coercive authority of the state, as required by the ideal of reciprocity,
that grounds a distributive egalitarian commitment among them.
The coercive authority of the state is an authority that each citizen has an equal
share in. Democratic reciprocity means that this great power can be imposed on
all only on terms that each can accept. This describes the idea of liberal democratic
legitimacy-that political power is legitimate only when it is exercised on terms
16. Rawls is explicit that reciprocity is a relevant criterion not only among democratic citizens but
also among peoples. See The Law of Peoples, supra note 3 at 35, 57.
17. Ibid. at 114.
18. See also Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 13 at 93-94, 40.
that all citizens can reasonably endorse. 9 The argument is that an institutional com-
mitment to distributive equality is one necessary way (though, presumably, not suf-
ficient) in which the coercive authority of the state can be justified to all and hence
made legitimate. That is, if the price of membership in a political society is lawful
coercion, the privilege of an institutionalized distributive egalitarian commitment
between citizens (among other things) is what legitimizes this coercion in the eyes
of members." As Richard Miller writes, it is the need "to provide adequate incen-
tives for compatriots to conform to the shared [coercive] institutions that one helps
to impose on them" that generates a concern for distributive equality in the domestic
sphere." In a similar spirit, Michael Blake writes that "the real purpose of the dif-
ference principle is to justify coercion to all those coerced [an inevitable fact of
the state], including the least advantaged."22
As an aside, it is worth noting that the fact that membership is considered non-
voluntary on this argument is not a rejection of the social contract idea. Social contract
accounts need not rely on the voluntary acceptance of one s membership in a society
but on the acceptance of the terms of membership in the given society. What indi-
viduals are asked to consent to (hypothetically) is not whether they want to be mem-
bers of a society; that is usually taken as a given. But precisely because membership
is presumed to be fixed, they are entitled to social arrangements that they could not
reasonably reject. Indeed, it is the presumption of non-voluntary membership that
gives much normative weight to the contract idea that the terms of social cooperation
as expressed by the basic institutions of society be acceptable to members.
The argument from coercion thus offers one explanation for why the criterion
of reciprocity generates distributive egalitarian commitments within democratic
states but not beyond the borders of states. Although the reciprocity requirement
remains in force in the global domain, there is no coercive global arrangement that
needs to be similarly justified to individuals in the world as a whole. Only in the
context of lawful coercion does reciprocity ground the commitment to distributive
justice for only in this context is there a coercive social arrangement whose legit-
imacy needs to be established. 3
19.Ibid. at 40-41.
20. As Paul Guyer lucidly reveals, this relationship between coercion, reciprocity and distributive
justice can be found in Kant's political philosophy. See Guyer, "Life, Liberty and Property: Rawls
and Kant" in his Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:
2000) at 274ff, 285ff. Whether this Kantian account of distributive justice supports the limited
thesis, I leave to one side for now. I suspect though, that if, as Guyer argues, the commitment
to distributive justice is required if property rights enforcement (necessary for turning the right
to property from a mere "provisional right" to a "conclusive" right) is to be reciprocally justifiable
to all involved, one can argue that in as far as there are international norms and laws defining
and protecting international property rights, then the Kantian account would deny the limited
thesis and instead support some global distributive commitment. For Guyer's arguments in this
direction, see his "The Possibility of Perpetual Peace" in J.C. Ciprut, ed., Ethics, Politics, and
Democracy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press) [forthcoming].
21. R. Miller, "Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern", supra note 3 at 203-04.
22. Blake, "Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy", supra note 3 at 283.
23. As a point of textual analysis, it is worth noting that R. Miller's reciprocity argument for dis-
tributive justice emphasizes the need to give democratic citizens incentives to accept and comply
with the coercive institutions of their society. Blake's argument focuses on personal autonomy,
claiming that coercive arrangements can be justified to fellow autonomous agents only if these
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On this argument, then, there is no general direct concern for distributive equality
among persons as such. The concern for distributive equality derives from the more
fundamental requirement that coercive political arrangement be justified to each
citizen on terms that each can accept (if it is to be legitimate), and it is this need
to justify the coercive authority of the state to all citizens that grounds this distribu-
tive commitment to them. 4 Nagel has accordingly said that distributive duties are"associative duties"; that is, they are duties that arise only among persons who share
a certain kind of social or institutional relationship.25
Before examining this attempt to justify the limited boundary thesis, it is worth
noting that the argument from coercion owes us some explanation as to why there
is no direct concern for equality between persons as such (that is, why distributive
equality is not an independent value but derives only from the need to legitimize
the state's coercive authority). Why are distributive duties only associative duties,
when there are other duties ofjustice among persons that obtain independently of
associative ties? (Nagel, after all, accepts duties of'justice having to do with human
rights that are independent of special ties.) That is, the argument from coercion
attempts to make the case that coercion is a sufficient condition for distributive
justice; but this leaves open the possibility that coercion is not a necessary condition,
that distributive justice can simply be a natural duty of justice. My point here is
not that such an argument (for taking distributive egalitarian duties to be a departure
from the default position of inequality) could not be made; my point is that the
default position of global equality, absent arguments to the contrary, is just as plau-
sible a starting point.26
Be that as it may, granting that distributive egalitarian duties are derivative duties
along the lines offered by the argument from coercion, the key question for my pur-
pose is whether the argument successfully supports the limited thesis.27
It is not clear that it does. For one, it is arguable that the global order is indeed
an involuntary and coercive one that affects profoundly and pervasively the life
prospects of many disadvantaged persons in the world, and that this order is sus-
tained and imposed on them through the complicity of others, in particular the
global well-off. At the extreme end, the current global order deprives many of access
arrangements do not permit excessive inequalities between them. But in either case, it is the idea
of reciprocity that is fundamental-both are concerned with providing individuals with reasons
to accept coercive institutions. Nagel's argument, as we will see in a moment, has again a different
focus. Nagel stresses not the fact that citizens are subjects of coercive arrangements but that they
are responsible authors of these arrangements and hence have a rightful say in how these arrange-
ments ought to be.
24. The argument from coercion is unlike the Hobbesian argument contemplated above. That argu-
ment was an argument about the concept of justice. The present argument has to do more with
the idea of legitimacy. It is not that without enforcement there can be no justice; it is that to justify
and legitimize the coercive enforcement authority of the state, the state (which is collectively
supported by every citizen) owes each of its citizens a distributive egalitarian commitment (among
other things).
25. Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice", supra note 3 at 121.
26. Some might say that distributive duties are positive duties and positive duties can only be asso-
ciative. But this (controversial) libertarian move is not one that the anti-global egalitarians I am
discussing would themselves accept.
27. The next three paragraphs draw on my Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism,
and Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 172-77.
to basic needs and goods." To be sure, these urgent deprivations are the sorts that
the anti-global egalitarians I am discussing can deal with for these are what Blake
calls instances of "absolute deprivations" rather than "relative deprivation". That
is, the current global order is plainly coercive because many individuals are denied
basic subsistence needs under its arrangement, and anti-global egalitarians do not
deny that there is a duty of humanity to assist people thus deprived.
But the global order is also coercive in ways that the domestic order is said to
be coercive, that is, it is coercive in the sense that a certain conformity and com-
pliance with a certain socio-political order is expected of persons. As in the domes-
tic setting, there is in the global arena a legal order that is binding and enforceable
on all, and from whose reach there is no meaningful escape, and which restricts
individual life opportunities and personal autonomy. International trade laws, prin-
ciples and laws governing territorial and political sovereignty, international norms
regulating the conduct of multinational corporations, patent laws and other property
laws concerning ownership of resources harvested from international waters, and
so on are just some examples of a highly complex international legal system under
whose regulation all persons are virtually subjects, and which limits the options
and opportunities persons effectively have. And if the legitimacy of coercive social
arrangements that limits personal autonomy is what motivates the need for a dis-
tributive egalitarian commitment in domestic society, then so too, it seems, must
the legitimacy of the global legal order rest on some distributive egalitarian com-
mitment.
It is important to stress that the international order is not simply coercive but
lawfully coercive. The argument from coercion stresses the need to legitimize the
legal coercive order of domestic society on those subject to its authority. That is,
the relevant coercion that is in need ofjustification (to autonomous persons) is that
which is legal and "ongoing. 29 So the analogy between the global and domestic
settings is impaired if global coercion is not a lawful and ongoing coercion. But
the examples of international coercion cited above pick out instances of lawful and
ongoing coercion. The international order is not only coercive but also, as is
attributed to the domestic political society, coercive in an institutional and legal
way. International coercive actions are not confined to just those actions outside
the bounds of international law (as in illegitimate interventions and illegal trading
practices that violate, say, WTO rules), but include also actions that are sanctioned,
and indeed often required, by international law. International laws and rules reg-
ulating the recognition of sovereignty that allow and even require corrupt regimes
to be tolerated by powerful countries with economic and political interests in sus-
taining these regimes, WTO rules on trade and patent rights, and less obvious ones
like norms and laws that recognize the sovereign right of states over any natural
resource within its borders, are legal rules that impose themselves in an ongoing
basis on individuals, and have the effect of coercing some by significantly limiting
their opportunities.
28. See Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, supra note 1; also Onora O'Neill, Bounds of Justice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
29. Blake, supra note 3 at 280.
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In addition to the global economic order that is being imposed on and enforced
against all countries and their citizens, another example of a clear instance of legal-
ized arrangement that can be seen as coercive of the global disadvantaged, and so
in whose eyes is illegitimate if there are no corresponding attempts to mitigate the
effects of that arrangement, are the immigration laws of individual (especially rich)
countries. Immigration laws, enacted domestically (but sanctioned by international
law and norms), are clearly legalized restrictions and impositions on non-members,
and the effects of these restrictions are most vividly felt by the global disadvantaged.
This is especially so in an existing global order in which resources and wealth are
so unequally distributed between countries, for the global disadvantaged are legally
and forcefully prevented from taking advantage of economic opportunities in better
off countries." My purpose here is not to deny the legitimacy of restricting immi-
gration as such, but only to identify another way in which our global arrangement
is coercive of persons in an ongoing and legal way, and which consequently needs
to be justified to those who are affected. Thus extending the domestic argument,
the legitimacy of restrictive laws of immigration, laws that are enforced by the state
but sanctioned internationally, must be conditional on there being some global dis-
tributive commitments. The global disadvantaged who are being deprived of eco-
nomic opportunities by laws restricting personal movement will have no reason
to consent to and comply with these laws otherwise. These restrictions need not
be seen by them as legitimate.
In short, if a legal coercive authority must be justified to persons living under
it in order for that authority to count as legitimate, either out of respect for their
autonomy (Blake) or to give them incentives to comply with the arrangement (R.
Miller), it does seem that the current global order upholds such a coercive legal
order that must be thus justified. And if the justification of coercive authority
requires an institutionalized commitment to distributive egalitarian justice, then
it seems too that the justification of the international coercive order requires some
global egalitarian distributive commitment.
One development of the lawful coercion argument stresses not the general fact
of coercive international law as such, but the notion of (coercive) property laws.
Distributive principles are appropriate (and indeed necessary from the point of view
ofjustice) for the institutions of the domestic society but not for international insti-
tutions because the legal institutions of political society cover a complex series of
norms and rules governing ownership. Distributive justice is, after all, not simply
allocative or redistributive justice. Distributive principles are meant to regulate the
background rules and norms of society that determine entitlements, just transac-
tions, contract laws, and property rights." It is concerned not just with the expost
30. It is of course true that one's place of birth is a natural fact and not itself a matter of justice. As
Rawls has noted, natural facts in themselves that are neither just nor unjust; what is just or unjust
is "the way the basic structure of society makes use of these natural differences and permits them
to affect the social fortune of citizens, their opportunities in life, and the actual terms of coop-
eration between them" (Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory" in Samuel Freeman,
ed., John Rawls: Collected Papers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) at 337.
The natural fact of a person's geographical place of birth becomes an issue ofjustice because
global institutions turn that fact into an actual social disadvantage for the person.
31. Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract, supra note 3.
facto allocation of a given bundle of goods and resources after they are produced
among persons (that is, it is not concerned simply with the question of what should
be taken from whom to give to whom), but is concerned more fundamentally with
the conditions ex ante that determine rightful ownership, and this presupposes in
place a whole series of laws regulating property rights, transactions, contracts and
so on. Put another way, distributive justice is also backward looking in the sense
that it looks to the background conditions that fix rightful ownership, whereas
allocative justice is solely forward looking in that it aims to redistribute resources
within accepted background norms of ownership. We can perhaps speak of a global
allocative justice or redistributive justice (and perhaps the 0.7% of GNP contribution
to ODA is an example of this), but not global distributive justice, so the argument
goes. Thus Samuel Freeman observes that what "makes the incredibly complicated
system of legal norms possible that underlie economic production, exchange, and
consumption, is a unified political system that specifies these norms and revises
them to meet changing conditions." Yet "[n]othing comparable to the basic structure
of society exists on the global level."32
Freeman's argument offers an important reminder of the focus of distributive
justice, that it is concerned with the background institutions of society that define
rightful ownership in the first place and is not concerned with the mere allocation
of resources and goods against a taken-for-granted theory of ownership. Yet it seems
to me that the claim that there are no analogous background conditions that specify
norms of rightful ownership of resources and wealth seems to underplay the exis-
tence of a unified system of legal principles and rules that are operational in the
global domain. For example, patent laws and other laws about intellectual property,
international laws regulating how resources may be harvested from international
waters, and more fundamentally, but less obviously for it is just so pervasive and
taken for granted, the principle of state territorial sovereignty that assumes state
ownership over resources that happen to lie within a country's borders, clearly do
establish norms of ownership in a very profound and basic way. And these norms
are, of course, not naturally given or inevitable, but are sanctioned and affirmed
by international legal principles and practice. These international norms regulating
global ownership seem to me to both generate the condition for distributive justice
and provide the appropriate subject-matter of distributive principles.
Now as a response to the above considerations, one might point out that inter-
national property laws, in fact international law as a whole for that matter, are dif-
ferent from domestic laws. Freeman writes that "[g]lobal cooperation and global
institutions are supervenient upon social cooperation and basic social institutions."33
By this he means, as I understand him, that global norms and laws are fundamentally
derived from domestic law in that these are norms and laws legislated by peoples
as independent and self-determining cooperative units and put into international
effect only through external arrangements (i.e., treaties) with each other. That is,
there can be no international law without bounded independent political units capable
32. Ibid., emphasis mine.
33. Ibid.
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of making laws. For this reason, Freeman notes that global institutions are different"qualitatively" from the basic structure of a domestic society.
Yet it seems to me that this line of argument conflates the source of international
law, on the one side, and the scope and content of international law on the other.
Although international laws can have their origin in domestic enactments, this does
not mean that they cannot come to have a distinctive scope of application the pur-
pose of which is to regulate the international rather than domestic domain.
Moreover, that most (if not all) international laws have their origins in the form
of treaties between independent nations, does not mean that these laws do not even-
tually come to acquire a certain normative independence over time such that their
authority comes no longer from the fact of the historical agreement between party
countries to specific treaties, but from their general affirmation and acceptance
by the international society over time, and can come to generate expectations not
just from signatories to the particular treaties but from all lawful members of inter-
national society. Current international laws about human rights, prevention of geno-
cide and so on have their grounds of enforcement in agreements between signatory
countries but nonetheless, through international practice, set lawful standards and
expectations for all countries regardless of whether or not they were original sig-
natories to these agreements. Indeed, it is hardly plausible that the norms grounding
these laws derive their normative force solely from actual agreement between states,
even if their legal enforceability and the means thereof are. In any case, there is
certainly no opting out with respect to these laws, and hence it is a mischaracter-
ization to say that they are only voluntary. The possibility of international laws that
can come to have an autonomous authority and force (even though the original
authority of these laws are domestic) is what paves the way for a lawful international
order, as recognized by Kant. As he writes, "partly by an optimal internal arrange-
ment of the civil constitution, and partly by common external agreement and leg-
islation, a state of [international] affairs is created which, like a civil commonwealth,
can maintain itself automatically."34 That is, even if international law is partly con-
stituted by some original agreement between independent sovereign states, it can
come, over time through international practice and the generation of mutual expec-
tation, to enjoy an independent status and can retain its authority as law indepen-
dently of the historical agreements between actors.
Thus far, it seems then that if the need to justify a lawful coercive order is that
which motivates a distributive egalitarian commitment, that motivation is also avail-
able beyond the borders of states in as far as the global order comprises also a lawful
and coercive involuntary order. More has to be said as to why the domestic legal
order is distinct from the global legal order such that the former generates egalitarian
distributive commitments but not the latter.
Thomas Nagel has offered what seems to me to be a version of the argument
from lawful coercion that side-steps my above response.35 For Nagel, it is not simply
34. Immanuel Kant, "Idea For a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" in H.S. Reiss, trans.
by and ed., Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 48, stress
in original.
35. I am grateful for David Reidy's critical and helpful comments on the following paragraphs.
the fact that citizens are affected by coercive institutions that is morally significant,
and the reason for which an explanation for institutionally sanctioned inequalities
is owed to them. What is crucial, on Nagel's account, is the fact that citizens are
also mutually engaged in the making and maintaining of these coercive arrange-
ments. Because laws sustaining our social institutions are also made in our name,
and we are responsible for supporting these laws through our actions and decisions,
we have a hand in any inequalities admitted by our lawful institutions. Hence we
are consequently entitled to ask why we should accept the inequalities generated
by these laws. It is this "engagement of the will" in the system of coercion that we
jointly sustain that generates a distributive commitment among persons so engaged.
He writes:
Without being given a choice, we are assigned a role in the collective life of a par-
ticular society. The society makes us responsible for its acts, which are taken in our
name and on which, in a democracy, we may even have some influence; and it holds
us responsible for obeying its laws and conforming to its norms, thereby supporting
the institutions through which advantages and disadvantages are created and dis-
tributed.Insofar as those institutions admit arbitrary inequalities, we are, even though
the responsibility has been simply handed to us, responsible for them, and we therefore
have standing to ask why we should accept them. This request for justification has
moral weight even if we have in practice no choice but to live under the existing
regime. The reason is that its requirements claim our active cooperation, and this can-
not be legitimately done without justification-otherwise it is pure coercion.36
In short, some justification is owed to me (as a member of a political society) for
any inequalities that the lawful order of my society permits because I am also a
law-making member of society. I am entitled to this justification because I am not
simply a subject of the law but a rightful author of the law. It is my capacity as one
of the authors of these laws (an authorship that I express through my participation
in the institutional life of the society) that gives me the moral "standing" to demand
from my fellow members a justification for these laws. Thus any legal institutional
arrangement that is disadvantageous to some members must be justifiable to them
since they are entitled to ask, given that these are laws supposedly also made in
their own name, why they should support and accept such a lawful arrangement.
An institutionalized distributive egalitarian commitment among members of a soci-
ety regulates and determines the bounds of acceptable inequalities between mem-
bers, thus rendering the lawful arrangement agreeable to all. 7
36. Nagel, supra note 3 at 129, emphasis mine.
37. The reference to "law-maker" suggests that, for Nagel, a just society has to be a democratic society
in which citizens are not merely participants of a system of social cooperation but that they have
some say in the terms of cooperation. This contractarian reading ofjustice in Nagel, namely that
a just society has to be democratic in some form, that is, a society whose members are in some
sense authors of their own laws and not simply subject to them, is consistent with Nagel's overall
position. Consider his opposition to Rawls's account of international toleration. Nagel writes
that "there seems nothing wrong with being particularly supportive of transformation in a liberal
direction" (ibid. at 135) even when we concede that there are "obvious practical reasons" for
not imposing liberal democratic ideals on nonliberal societies. "We owe it to other people-con-
sidered as individuals-to allow them, and to some degree enable them, to collectively govern
themselves" (ibid., my stress). That is, we owe it to others, morally speaking, to allow them, if
not even help them, establish domestic democratic institutions.
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Thus on Nagel's account, it seems that even if the laws made in our name may
be unfavorable to others (under whose name these laws are not made), the latter
are not entitled to an explanation. It is only when one is also disadvantaged by laws
that one is also supposed to have a say in, or a role in shaping, that entitles one to
some explanation and justification for a given arrangement. So even if I am right
above that international law is coercive of many, if it is indeed true that international
law is however not made in the name of persons as members of the global society
as such but is made by agents in their capacities as citizens, then only fellow citizens
are owed any justification for any social and legal order and the inequalities admit-
ted by such order, for only fellow citizens are mutually engaged in the making of
these arrangements. "The state makes unique demands on the will of its mem-
bers-or the members make unique demands on one another through the institu-
tions of the state-and those exceptional demands bring with them exceptional
obligations, the positive obligations of justice."38 Because there are no similar"unique demands" on persons by the global order, no one has standing to demand
justification for a global order that disadvantages some relative to others, and so
the positive obligations of distributive justice in that context do not exist. Freeman's
observation considered above, that international law supervenes on domestic law,
is revived thus: what is qualitatively different between international and domestic
laws is that domestic laws are made in the name of citizens whereas international
laws, while enforced against foreigners, and are not laws made in their name.
Nagel's thesis that it is the "engagement of one's will" in the lawful institutions
of one's society that gives one the standing to demand a justification for any arbi-
trary inequalities that institutions generate is complex and challenging. I don't pre-
tend to be able to offer a decisive response to it. But some tentative remarks may
be made. A first response is to insist that there are international laws and policies
that are in fact made in the name of all persons governed by these laws. For
instance, when the General Assembly of the United Nations adopts resolutions and
policies that affect persons anywhere in the world, this is done supposedly in the
name of the people (of the different countries) that the delegates to the Assembly
officially represent. In as far as we accept that an ideal state is one in which the
government represents the people in some appropriate way, any enactment of inter-
national law by governments of countries will be in the name of the people they
supposedly represent. So even if distributive justice considerations arise only among
individuals who collectively make laws in their own name, it is contestable whether
this rules out a consideration for global distributive justice. Of course it is true that
as a descriptive matter, many governments do not effectively represent their com-
patriots (especially in cases of non-democracies). But Nagel's thesis is a normative
and not a descriptive one. It establishes the condition for state legitimacy. The point
concerns how we ought to understand and conceive of individuals. We are to see
them not merely as subjects of the laws of their country but also in some ways as
the rightful authors of these laws. Under this condition, it seems that international
laws are laws made in the name of a people that are represented by its delegates.
38. Ibid. at 130.
Nagel acknowledges the formation of new networks of global governance that
have transcended the traditional account of international law as simply treaties
between states. Yet, he notes that these "these networks bring together represen-
tatives not of individuals, but of state functions and institutions" and this indirect
relationship to individuals is morally significant?9 But even if it is right that par-
ticipants in global institutions are representatives of states rather than of individuals,
which seems in fact correct for. the most part, should this not at least generate some
distributive commitment between states? That is, if states are in fact making inter-
national law in the name of each other, shouldn't the considerations applicable to
individuals within domestic society analogously apply between states? If so, this
would generate at the very least some distributive egalitarian duties between coun-
tries. More to the point, however, it is not clear why the fact that individuals are
represented through different institutions, some more directly than others, at dif-
ferent political arenas, should be seen as morally significant in the way Nagel sug-
gests. The different forms of representation can be seen as an institutional division
of labor, that is, as different ways of representing the interests of individuals. Indeed,
even in the domestic society, individuals are not always directly represented-their
different interests are represented through different institutions, some more directly
than others. Yet presumably Nagel does not require complete direct individual rep-
resentation in the political order of society as a precondition of the "engagement
of one's will" in the institutional life of their society.
But leaving aside whether international laws are or should be seen as laws made
in the name of all persons affected, there is a fundamental principle in Nagel's thesis
that demands closer examination. This is the idea that only persons who are also
authors of coercive lawful institutions have some standing to demand that these
institutions not be to their disadvantage relative to other participants in the insti-
tutions. The fact that one is simply affected or subject to some lawful arrangement,
even disadvantageously, does not sufficiently entitle one to some justification.
This point is well illustrated in Nagel's response to an anticipated objection, that
immigration laws enacted by individual (rich) countries constitute a class of laws
that affect outsiders disadvantageously. On the objection, aren't foreigners who are
disadvantaged by the immigration laws of (rich) countries entitled to an explanation
for this coercive arrangement, and would the justification of immigration restrictions
not require some distributive commitments to them? Nagel points out, in response,
that immigration policies do not need to be justified to outsiders because immi-
gration "policies are simply enforced against the nationals of other states; the laws
are not imposed in their name, nor are they asked to accept and uphold these laws.
Since no acceptance is demanded of them, no justification is required that explains
why they should accept such discriminatory policies, or why their interests have
not been given equal consideration. It is sufficient justification to claim that the
policies do not violate their prepolitical human rights."4
I think some questions may be raised concerning this focus on the rights of per-
sons qua law-makers rather than simply qua subjects of the law. Why is it the case
39.Ibid. at 139.
40. Ibid. at 129-30, emphasis mine.
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that no explanation is owed to persons simply on the ground that they are affected
by laws and institutions that others are imposing on them? Why is a justification
(for unfavorable arrangements) owed only to those who have a hand in sustaining
the arrangement and not simply to anyone who is affected, whether or not they have
a role in the making of the arrangement? If laws made in our name have a disad-
vantageous impact on others, can they not demand an explanation from us even
though these laws were not laws made in their name? Indeed, if we accept as a gen-
eral criterion of legal legitimacy that laws affecting persons must be laws that they
could themselves accept, then Nagel's point that only those in whose name a law
is enforced have "standing" to demand some explanation seems ungrounded.
Legitimate and lawful coercion would seem to require that anyone affected by coer-
cive arrangements is entitled to ask for some explanation for laws that may be
imposed on them.
One might say that it is not the fact that a law is imposed on some that is morally
relevant. What is relevant is the presence of a lawful and coercive authority that
has dominion over one. Hopeful immigrants, while they do find their movements
restricted by immigration laws that can be enforced coercively against them, are
not under the dominion of the authority enacting that restriction as long as they
remain outside the jurisdiction of that society. Following Dworkin, one can say that
a state because of its dominion over all within its jurisdiction owes each one of its
citizens equal concern if it is to be legitimate in their eyes. But it owes no such equal
concern, so one might say, to strangers at its gates even if it is the fact that its (immi-
gration) laws are what is keeping them out, for it holds no dominion over them until
they are admitted (and therefore until they are admitted, it doesn't owe them equal
concern).
Yet this reasoning perhaps begs the question by taking it for granted that the
dominion of a powerful state coincides with its territorial boundaries. The example
of immigration laws and practice shows, to the contrary, that states can exercise
some kind of authority and dominion over persons who are not within their tra-
ditionally recognizes jurisdiction. States do expect outsiders to obey and accept
their immigration laws. More explicitly, the foreign policies of powerful countries
do affect numerous people who are not citizens, and lawfully so if these are policies
enacted according to accepted domestic legislative procedures. So how can it be
said that a state can exercise dominion only over its citizens, when the laws it passes
domestically can affect quite pervasively the lives of outsiders?4' Why is this per-
vasive and profound and legal influence on persons' lives not a form of dominion?
The real issue, in short, is what is meant by the exercising of dominion over another.
I am suggesting that one need not be a member of a society before it can exercise
dominion over one, if we understand by having dominion over another as having
the capacity to lawfully affect significantly the life options of another.
41. Dworkin writes, "A political community that exercises dominion over its own citizens, and
demands from them allegiance and obedience to its laws, must take up an impartial, objective
attitude toward them all .... Equal concern ... is the special and indispensable virtue of
sovereigns." Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000)
at 6.
To be sure, Nagel does not say that no explanation is ever owed to persons
affected by laws not made in their name. When externally imposed arrangements
and laws affect persons in ways that violate their "'prepolitical' human rights" some
accounting for the violation is demandable. "Prepolitical" rights are the rights per-
sons have independently of any institutional arrangements, and these are, for Nagel,
limited to basic rights that include subsistence rights, but do not cover the right
to distributive equality of some sort. So when lawful arrangements merely allow
for inequalities, or where they only disadvantage some (without offending against
their basic rights), no explanation is owed to those so affected when they are only
subjects of these laws.
But why is an explanation owed only when people's prepolitical basic rights are
violated but not when they are put at a disadvantage? Is this a morally significant
distinction? Imagine a prepolitical state of nature in which a community A is settled
upstream in relation to another community B that is placed further downstream.
Imagine also that each of these communities is dependent on the resources from
the river. Suppose now that A elects to extend a net across the river for the purpose
of improving its yield of fish. Imagine also that this obstruction when constructed
will not violate any prepolitical rights of people in B; some fish and other essential
resources will continue to slip through, so the basic needs of the community is not
at threat. Still members in B will now have a diminished quality of life; perhaps
they now have to work extra hours to obtain the same amount of goods as they did
before the construction of the net. Or perhaps even though they still are able to meet
basic needs, they simply have fewer resources to work with now, thus compromising
their material quality of life. On Nagel's model, it seems, members of B have "no
standing to ask" why they should accept this arrangement. Their prepolitical rights
are not violated for they still are able to meet their subsistence needs; and the
arrangement (the net across the river) was not erected in their name but in the name
of people in A. But why is no explanation or justification owed to the people down-
stream by those upstream? The fact that this is an arrangement not made in their
name or for their sake is immaterial-what is material is that this arrangement
affects them disadvantageously. To be sure, if the construction of the net results
in the community downstream losing its means of subsistence, then a basic pre-
political right to subsistence has been violated and on Nagel's view the community
upstream can be held accountable by the affected community. But why is the com-
munity to be held accountable only when basic rights are infringed upon? Is the
fact that it has rendered another worse-off not something that it has to be held
accountable for, something for which it needs to justify?
Immigration is just one example of laws domestically enacted that affect others
disadvantageously and to whom, it seems from the above analogy, some justification
and explanation is owed. Domestic environmental laws regulating industrial pol-
lution levels, state subsidization of domestic sectors, laws regulating conduct of
national corporations and so on are other examples. It is the recognition that these
so called domestic policies affect outsiders and that some accounting is owed to
all negatively affected that have motivated the call for greater global democratic
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decision making and institutions with respect to certain issues like the environment,
conduct of corporations, state subsidy of agriculture and so on.
To be sure, if domestically enacted laws or policies do not make foreigners
worse-off, but only give them a worse deal compared to what fellow citizens get,
it is hard to see what the grounds for complaint can be. But there are cases of
laws domestically enacted that are not just relatively advantageous to members
but that in effect make outsiders worse-off than they would be without these laws.
If there indeed are such cases, do we not owe outsiders an explanation (for why
they are being made worse-off) even if these are not laws made in their name?
Don't we owe them an explanation even if we are not violating their prepolitical
rights but simply because we are making them less well-off than they otherwise
would be? Why should those negatively affected accept this coexistence peace-
fully otherwise? Indeed, isn't one of the arguments for greater global cooperation
and democracy prompted by the recognition that there is a need to justify to each
other globally our decisions and policies that can affect others in ways that are
disadvantageous?42
It seems to me that Nagel's attempt to drive a wedge between domestic and inter-
national legal contexts, thus providing a unique grounding for egalitarian distributive
justice in the domestic but not international context, does not fully succeed. It relies
controversially on the point that only persons in whose name supposedly an arrange-
ment is established and supported have the standing to ask why they should accept
the arrangement when that arrangement admits of arbitrary inequalities. But the
ideal of legitimacy seems to suggest that anyone affected by an arrangement that
is disadvantageous of her or him in the sense that she or he is rendered worse-off
by the arrangement is entitled to some justification and accounting, whether or not
the arrangement was established in her or his name, especially when escaping from
the effects of the arrangement is not a real option. That arrangement would be a
case of "pure coercion" otherwise.
11. The Justice of State Boundaries
Let me now turn to the second set of considerations that I have called arguments
for the ethical significance of boundaries. As I said, this class of arguments does
not directly challenge the global scope of distributive justice. Rather, it attempts
to show that there are competing considerations or claims ofjustice that can limit
what global egalitarian justice can demand of people. In particular, these arguments
try to show that citizens owe to each other certain special obligations of distributive
justice that may outweigh their duty of distributive justice towards foreigners.
We can divide arguments for the special duties of citizens into two broad
42. This point is suggested in Kant: "The concept of Right, insofar as it is related to an obligation
corresponding to it (i.e., the moral concept of Right), has to do first only with the external and
indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as facts, can have (direct
or indirect) influence on each other." Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Mary Gregor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 56. See also sections 43-45 in "The Doctrine
of Right".
categories-those that treat these special duties as voluntary duties and those that
treat them as non-voluntary duties. On the broadly voluntary approach, the special
duties that citizens have to each other derive from their willing participation in a
mutually beneficial association. It does not mean that citizens must have explicitly
consented to these special duties, nor does it entail that membership in the political
society is explicitly voluntary. The idea is that there are benefits to being a member
of a social cooperative scheme which the well-ordered state is, and in accepting
these benefits, one has also effectively consented to the special duties that come
with being a participant and beneficiary of that cooperative scheme. The voluntarily
acceptance condition is satisfied if there is willing and ongoing enjoyment of the
benefits of being a member of the association. For short, we can call this the
"mutual benefit argument" for special obligations.
What some anti-global egalitarians go on to claim is that these special obligations
are obligations ofjustice between citizens that can limit the demands of global egal-
itarian justice. This argument, it is worth noting, is more modest than the "shared
institutions" argument considered above. The present argument does not claim that
only within an existing political society do considerations of distributive justice
gain traction. It makes only the limited claim that special considerations ofjustice
arise among individuals sharing a mutually beneficial scheme, and that what indi-
viduals owe to each other more generally as a matter ofjustice will have to be bal-
anced against such special duties that they can have. That persons have special
obligations to their fellow citizens seems grantable. What is more controversial is
the claim that these special duties ofjustice can limit the demands of global justice.
It is this claim that we need to examine, momentarily.
On the broadly non-voluntary account of special obligations, individuals do not
acquire special obligations only when they have voluntarily assumed them in some
way but can acquire special obligations simply by virtue of their occupying a role
or social position to which these obligations attach. Moral philosophers sometimes
refer to these as "associative duties".43 Associative duties are a species of special
duties, but unlike other kinds of special duties, they pick out those special duties
that attach to social roles, that occupants of a role have simply by virtue of being
an occupant, even when they have not volunteered for the role. To say that a duty
is an associative duty does not mean that the role to which the duty attaches cannot
be voluntarily assumed. It means rather that the normative force of that duty comes
not from the voluntary assumption of that role but directly from what it means to
be an occupant of that role. We can call this the argument from associative duties.
The different social roles that we occupy are characterized by different norms
that give meaning and value to these roles, and the special duties that an occupant
of roles has is a function of these norms." For example, we ordinarily accept that
among the norms inherent in the ideal of friendship is some kind of special concern
or loyalty towards friends. One who does not show her friends any special concern,
43. Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligation" (1994) XCI/7 J. Phil. 333; Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries
andAllegiances (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
44. See Hardimon, supra note 43.
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or more fundamentally rejects the norm of special concern as inherent in the notion
of friendship, does not know what it means to be a friend. It is part of being in a
friendship that one shows a friend special concern. One who rejects this special
concern is not occupying the role of friend as we ordinarily understand it.
But associative duties are important in another way. Not only are they duties
that inherently attach to certain roles or positions, but they are also duties that are
not fully reducible to some more general moral principles. For example, one mis-
understands and under-appreciates the value of friendship if one understands the
special concern for friends to be ultimately, say, a strategy or a division of moral
labor for maximizing overall social utility (that is, if everyone were to care specially
for their friends, the good of society can be best realized). As Scheffler puts it, "it
is pathological to attach nothing but instrumental value to any of one's personal
relationships.... [And] if one values one's relationship to a particular person non-
instrumentally, one will inevitably see it as a source of reasons for action .... for
treating that person differently from others."45 Someone who takes the value of
friendship to be entirely derivable from the principle of utility, or some even other
general principle like the ideal of mutual benefit or the duty of gratitude, would
be a false friend. She would in fact not be participating in a friendship relation and
is liable to be a person to leave a "friend" high and dry when it is no longer mutually
beneficial to stay in the relationship, or when the principle of gratitude does not
require that the relationship be sustained.
Some people might think that the argument from associative duties relies on
a philosophically untenable account of the special duties of citizenship compared
to the mutual benefit model. After all, citizenship is unlike say friendship or kinship
on a number of dimensions. But still the position is not entirely implausible (and
some philosophers have defended or at least entertained this possibility). For the
sake of discussion, I will simply (to my own disadvantage) grant this associative
duty account of special citizenship duties. I hope to argue that even if the special
duties of citizenship are associative duties, they don't provide reasons for limiting
the demands of global egalitarian justice.
The case for limiting egalitarian demands here is not that distributive duties are
only strictly associative duties and so have no global scope. That argument was
discussed in the previous section (e.g., the discussion on Nagel). The present argu-
ment is agnostic about the scope of distributive justice. The claim is that the (spe-
cial) associative duties of citizenship present special demands among citizens that
can limit what global distributive justice can ask of them.
I mention the mutual benefit and associative duties arguments concurrently
because my response to each will be structurally similar. Although the mutual ben-
efit and associative duties arguments give different reasons for the special duties
of citizenship, what is key in each of these arguments (in their defense of the sig-
nificance of boundaries thesis) is the claim that special citizenship duties can limit
the requirements of global egalitarian justice. My argument will be that, whether
45. Scheffler, supra note 43 at 121.
we take patriotic duties to be mutually-beneficial or associative, that last move is
unsustainable.46
My response will be two-pronged: (i) while membership in an association can
have its special privileges and these privileges may be distributed by principles inter-
nal to the association, it does not follow that what these privileges rightly are fall
outside considerations ofjustice external to the association, and (ii) more funda-
mentally, the boundaries that define spheres or units of special concern (and con-
sequently membership in such units) are not themselves immune from evaluations
from the point of view of justice.
On the first prong of the response: Consider the argument from mutual benefit.
To repeat, the first step of the argument is that citizens belong to a mutually ben-
eficial arrangement and in accepting the benefits have also accepted the duties that
come with it. The second step of the argument is that these special duties can limit
the claims of non-members. Whether or not we endorse the first move as a correct
justification for special citizenship duties, the second step of the argument cannot
be permitted without further arguments. Individuals may voluntarily form and par-
take in mutually beneficial arrangements, and accept special duties that come from
participating in this arrangement. But it is another thing to say that simply by virtue
of opting to join or form a mutually beneficial arrangement that one is straightaway
absolved of one's duties to non-participants. If this were so, we might as well say
that the demands of justice and morality may be unilaterally declined, for moral
agents may simply absolve themselves of their outstanding responsibilities by vol-
untarily taking on new and presumably less burdensome ones. But this, of course,
is not how we understand the nature of moral duties-a person may not release
herself from her outstanding duties simply through some voluntary act of hers.
The main point to note, then, is that while persons may have special duties to
one another because they share a mutually beneficial arrangement (or simply
because of what it means to be an occupant of a certain role), the fact that they have
these special duties alone does not absolve them of any outstanding moral com-
mitments or duties ofjustice to non-participants. In fact, it is the other way around-
what kinds of mutually benefit associations people may form and what kinds of
special duties people may have on account of their participation in these associations
are to be limited by what individuals owe to each other at large. A well-organized
criminal gang may be described as a mutual benefit association. But we do not say
that this means that members of the gang by virtue of their special duties to one
another are no longer required to respect the right of nonmembers to property, not
to be harmed and so on. The anti-global egalitarian argument from mutual benefit,
if endorsed, must absurdly allow that a person's duty ofjustice to individuals may
be limited if she is part of a criminal organization that requires her to pay special
attention to her fellow members. Special duties do not limit what general duties
ofjustice demand of persons; rather general duties ofjustice set limits to what kinds
46. Thus I don't attempt to argue that patriotic favoritism is indefensible per se or without any ratio-
nal basis. For carefully laid out arguments in this direction, see Charles Jones, Global Justice
at ch. 7.
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of special duties people can freely take on. One simply cannot take on a special
duty that one is, as a matter of'justice, prohibited from carrying out. To put it plainly,
that there are distinct spheres ofjustice does not mean that there need not be justice
between these spheres.47
This general point about the relationship between special duties and general
duties applies to the associative duties argument for the moral significance of
boundaries. The fact, even if true, that it is part of what it means to be a citizen
that we show fellow citizens special concern does not mean that the content of this
special concern can be determined independently of what strangers can rightly claim
of us. We can accept that friends can have special duties or concern for one another,
and we can accept that these special duties are non-derivative but issue directly from
what it means to be in that kind of relationship which we call friendship. But it is
another thing to say that these special duties need not respect any bounds. On the
contrary, we take the special duties of friendship to be limited by what justice per-
mits-this is what allows us to say of a friendship that it has degenerated into crony-
ism, or of kinship that is has degenerated into nepotism. Special concern for friends
that violate norms ofjustice that apply to all persons falls outside what is permitted
in the name of friendship.48
So even if it is correct that citizenship obligations are associative, that it is part
of what it means to be a good citizen that we show each other special concern, it
does not follow that that the claims of outsiders must be outweighed. On the con-
trary, absent additional considerations, it is more the other way around. Before we
can know what it is that citizens owe to each other by virtue of their status as com-
patriots, we need first to know what it is that they may distribute among themselves,
and this cannot be determined independently of what it is that they rightly own,
which in turn cannot be determined without reference to what it is that they owe
as a matter ofjustice to non-citizens. To put this point plainly, to know how much
I must distribute among my fellows, I must first need to know what it is that I
rightly have. This means that before we can realize our duties of justice to com-
patriots, we must first have an account of global distributive justice and live up
to its demands.
Notice that my above considerations, consistent with the associative duties argu-
ment, do not reduce the special duties of citizenship into some instrumental or
strategic device to further the ends of global justice. It grants that these special duties
are not reducible in that way. What it says is that even though these special duties
have a certain normative independence, they are nonetheless to be limited by the
demands ofjustice, and this means that they cannot be properly fulfilled without
first determining what justice does demand of us. What we may call the "constrain-
ability" of an associative duty by principles of justice on the one hand, and the
reduction of that duty to principles ofjustice on the other, are two distinct features.
Friendship duties may be constrained by, say, the general duty to warn others against
47. See Amy Gutmann, "Justice Across the Spheres" in Miller & Walzer, supra note 3.
48. Saying that duties of friendship are limited by considerations ofjustice does not mean that these
duties are derivable from justice; rather it means only that the scope and content of these duties
are constrained by the requirements of justice.
foreseeable harm; but it does not mean that the values of friendship are reducible
to or derivable from the principle of warning against harm.
Now the anti-global egalitarian may at this point accuse me of question-begging.
She may say that I have assumed some kind of global egalitarianism as the default
requirement of justice and so naturally I can limit special duties between citizens
to that egalitarian requirement. But I have not made any false assumptions. It is
the anti-global egalitarians who have unwarrantedly assumed that they have a case
against global egalitarianism when they say that I am begging the question.
Remember that so far the case against the universal scope of egalitarian justice has
not succeeded. So in defending the moral significance of boundaries, the anti-global
egalitarian cannot assume that this case has been made.
In sum, however citizens come to acquire special duties ofjustice to their com-
patriots, it does not follow that these special duties can limit what global justice
can demand of them. On the contrary, without further argument, the default position
is to limit the kinds of special duties people can take on by what they owe to all
others in general.
The second prong of my response to the ethical significance of boundaries
addresses a more fundamental point, a point that is already suggested, I believe,
by the above considerations. Units or boundaries of special concern are themselves
unjust if they confer special privileges on members at the unjustifiable expense
of non-members. There are two ways that the justness of boundaries of special con-
cern can themselves be called into doubt. One is when the terms of membership
are in themselves indefensible (eg. we might think associations whose membership
are inappropriately based on race are questionable). Another is if the existence of
these special units of concern sustains or exacerbates existing injustices, as when
those already unfairly advantaged join together to form associations that further
their advantages, or when the formation of these associations put those already
unfairly disadvantaged and left out at a further disadvantage. So, "males only" busi-
ness associations can be criticized not just because of their gendered terms of mem-
bership, but also because these associations allow already advantaged individuals
to gain further advantages relative to non-members.
Now perhaps the boundaries of spheres of special concern that characterize most
rich countries need not be unjust with respect to their membership criteria. Few
countries today adopt, say, a morally indefensible race based criterion of immi-
gration (as say Australia did with its "White Australia" policy in earlier decades).
But if only a few well-off countries violate this first condition ofjust boundaries
and membership, it is less clear that many meet the second condition, which is that
the boundaries and membership of units of special concern do not further existing
background injustices. To return to a scenario discussed earlier, one reason why
immigration restrictions in rich countries call out for justification (to outsiders who
are potentially kept out) is not because these are based on arbitrary factors like race,
but because these restrictions in the context of global inequality are odds with the
freedom of persons to move and to better their economic condition. In a world
marked by great economic imbalances, units of special concernfrom which many
already deprived others are kept out and in which members, privileged to begin
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with, confer additional special privileges on one another, have the effect of aggra-
vating the situation of the global disadvantaged. Not only do they remain deprived
of access to more resources; they are prevented from such access by strictly policed
boundaries from moving and bettering their opportunities. And, internally, partic-
ipants in advantageous spheres of cooperation from which others are kept out often
are able to further improve their situation, thus furthering the imbalance between
members and non-members. Far from grounding special patriotic commitments
that can limit the demands of global egalitarian justice, the justice of the boundaries
of citizenship is impaired under conditions of global inequality. And when bound-
aries are unjustifiable, they clearly cannot go on to justify limitations on what justice
in fact demands. Whether persons voluntarily create mutual benefit associations
or simply find themselves born into and participating in associative roles that come
attached with special duties, the justice of the boundaries of these associations can-
not be determined independently of what justice to outsiders requires, much less
limit its demands. The boundaries of special concern are justifiable only if these
boundaries and the special privileges of membership that they confer do not upset
the duties of justice that people owe to each other at large.
The above comments are not meant to establish the case for open borders.49 My
point, simply, is that the justice of the boundaries of citizenship (and hence of the
special concern membership can confer) cannot be taken for granted, that the
boundaries of special considerations are justifiable only under certain conditions.
This does not mean no well-off countries may regulate immigration under con-
ditions of economic injustice. Justice is, after all, an ongoing quest, and to expect
full realization of justice before special concern may be expressed in the human
world is to deny any possibility of such expression. The real task for moral agents
is to do their fair share in the promotion ofjustice. Among other things, what this
means is that states may regulate immigration but only if they are also doing their
share in correcting background global inequalities. So a rich country may restrict
immigration only if it is prepared to live up to its global distributive commitments.
To simplify this into a maxim, a country that wishes to keep strangers out must
not insist on keeping more than its fair share of resources in.
IV. Conclusion
Let me recap the central claims of my discussion. I began by suggesting that global
egalitarians can attempt to extend reasons for caring about inequalities in the domes-
tic case to the global context. Anti-global egalitarians can try to block this extension
by arguing that the reasons for caring about domestic inequalities are unique to
the domestic political sphere. I have tried, in defense of the global scope of dis-
tributive justice, to show that the case for limiting the boundary of distributive jus-
tice in this way does not succeed. Until there are defensible reasons for limiting
egalitarian considerations to the state, the default position, for egalitarians, is that
of global egalitarianism. Here, the anti-global egalitarian may try to show that the
49. Joseph Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: the case for open borders" (1987) 49/3 Rev. Politics 251.
global scope of distributive justice notwithstanding, the special duties of justice
that citizens have to each other can limit the application of global distributive
demands. But if global egalitarianism is the default position, any special concern
compatriots owe to each other must be limited by the demands of global egalitarian
justice, not the other way around, for we do not say that background justice can
be ignored and outweighed simply when people take on special obligations.
Fundamentally, the boundary of distributive justice cannot be defined by the bound-
aries and membership of special concern when the justice of these boundaries and
membership is open to question. Indeed a key issue of global justice, namely the
question of the boundary of distributive justice, cannot proceed without consid-
eration of the effects of existing political boundaries on persons' opportunities and
access to resources. Again, my thesis is not that political boundaries have no sig-
nificance and are to be imagined away in constructing an account of global justice.
The point, rather, is that the justice of political boundaries cannot be simply taken
for granted, and consequently they may be poor markers of the boundary of dis-
tributive justice.
